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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PROVO CITY, ) 
Appellee/Respondent, ) Supreme Court case No. 
) Court of Appeals No. 9811194-C A 
vs. ) 
DAVID G. CANNON, ) Priority No. 12 
Appellant/Petitioner. ) 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in its determination that a conviction for a violation of 
the offense of Child Abuse, a class A misdemeanor [§76-5-109(3)(a) U.C.A.] can be legally 
supported by evidence sufficient to establish that the accused committed an act that placed a 
child in a condition that potentially imperilled or threatened the child's health or welfare without 
evidence sufficient to establish that the accused actually caused a physical injury to the child or 
actually impaired the physical condition of the child? 
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The OPINION of the Utah Court of Appeals in Provo City v Cannon, Case No. 981194-
CA, was filed on 2 December, 1999. A copy of that decision is attached hereto as an Appendix. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals issued its OPINION on 2 December, 1999. This Petition is, 
therefore, timely if filed on or before 4 January, 2000, pursuant to Rules 22(d) and 48(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Additionally, this Court has jurisdiction to consider this 
Petition pursuant to §78-2-2(5) and §78-2a-4, U.C.A. 
1 
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CONTROLLING STATUTES and CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated, §76-5-109(3)(a): 
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, having the care 
or custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict a physical injury 
upon a child is guilty of an offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class A 
misdemeanor[.] 
Utah Code Annotated, §76-5-109(l)(c): 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a).... 
(b).... 
(c) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of a child which impairs 
the physical condition of the child, including: 
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin; 
(ii) a minor laceration or contusion; 
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; 
(iv) any other condition which imperils a child's health or welfare and 
which is not a serious physical injury as defined in Subsection (l)(d). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
David G. Cannon was convicted of Child Abuse, §76-5-109, U.C.A., after a bench trial 
heard by the Honorable Gary D. Stott, Judge, Fourth Judicial District, in and for Utah County. 
Cannon had moved for dismissal of the charges at the close of the City's case-in-chief arguing 
that the City had failed to offer any proof of a resulting physical injury to the child. The trial 
court denied the motion. Defendant rested without offering a further defense. Judgment was 
entered on the verdict of guilt but sentence was stayed when the trial court entered a Certificate 
of Probable Cause [Rule 27, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure]. Cannon appealed from the 
Judgment to the Utah Court of Appeals. The trial court's Judgment was affirmed by the Court of 
Appeal's Opinion filed on 2 December, 1999, in which Judge Norman H. Jackson and Judge 
2 
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Gregory K. Orme concurred in the opinion of Judge Pamela T. Greenwood. Cannon hereby 
appeals from the Opinion of the Utah Court Of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In its OPINION in this case, the Utah Court of Appeals adequately set forth the facts 
relevant to Cannon's appeal to that Court, which facts are likewise relevant in Cannon's appeal 
to this Court: 
On March 13, 1996, defendant held the nine-month-old son of Christine 
Armstrong over the railing of defendant's Third-story (sic) apartment balcony. 
Several witnesses observed the incident, including defendant's wife, Cami, who 
told the defendant to stop. Defendant then pulled the child back over the railing, 
and a neighbor took the baby from defendant (Opinion, paragraph 2). 
Cannon takes no objection to this statement of the facts, specifically noting that the trial 
court did not find nor did the Court of Appeals affirm that the evidence was sufficient to prove 
that the child sustained an actual physical injury or that the child's actual physical condition was 
affected in any manner. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT A 
CONVICTION FOR A VIOLATION OF §76-5-109(3)(A) U.C.A. CAN BE LEGALLY 
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT THE ACCUSED 
COMMITTED AN ACT THAT PLACED A CHILD IN A CONDITION THAT 
IMPERILLED OR THREATENED THE CHILD'S HEALTH OR WELFARE 
WITHOUT EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT THE ACCUSED 
ACTUALLY CAUSED A PHYSICAL INJURY TO THE CHILD OR ACTUALLY 
IMPAIRED THE PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE CHILD. 
The proper determination of this issue depends on the correct meaning and significance of 
§76-5-109(l)(c)(iv). Cannon acknowledges that the Court of Appeals applied the correct 
3 
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i 
methodology1 but respectfully disagrees with the Court's interpretation of the interplay of the 
various subsections of the statute. Simply put, the Court of Appeals determined that placing a i 
child in a condition of potential harm falls within the intent of the legislature, while Cannon 
argues that, to support a conviction, the plain meaning of the statute requires that an actor 
i 
actually cause a harm to a child - that the City was required to prove a resulting injury to the 
child or to prove Cannon actually adversely affected the physical condition of the child. 
The Court of Appeals concluded "under Utah's child abuse act, physical injury can include < 
acts that imperil or threaten a child's health or welfare without an actual physical impact on the 
child" (Opinion, paragraph 14).2 Cannon believes the Court erred by interpreting subsection76-5-
109(l)(c)(iv) isolated from and out of the context of the meaning of the section within which it 
exists and the overall scheme of the child abuse act.3 When considered in the context of the rest 
of the section it modifies, the term "any other condition which imperils the child's health or * 
welfare" [§76-5-109(l)(c)(iv)] has a significance different from that given it by the Court of 
Appeals. 
i 
*See citations and principals of statutory construction noted in paragraph 6 of the Opinion 
of the Court of Appeals. 
i 4 
Cannon assumes that by the repeated use of the term "physical impact" in its Opinion, 
the Court of Appeals does not imply that Cannon means to argue that this statute applies only in 
cases in which an actor strikes or hits a child. In fact, at oral argument, Cannon suggested that 
subjecting a child to a severe sunburn might be an example of creating an adverse physical 
condition in a child that the statute seeks to criminalize. Both below and here Cannon argues that 
conviction under the statute requires proof of either a physical injury or a demonstrated adverse 
effect on the physical condition of the child, such as was not proved in this case 
3
 When "construing a statute, our primary purpose '" is to give effect to the intent of the 
legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve."'" Wilson v Valley Mental 
Health, 969 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah, 1998). * 
4 
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Subsection (iv) exemplifies the definition of "physical injury" as set forth in subsection 
(l)(c), to wit: "an injury to or a condition of a child which impairs the physical condition of the 
child ...."(Emphasis added.) Thus, logically, the condition to which subsection (iv) refers is the 
physical condition of a child noted in subsection (l)(c). It is clear from the entire section that the 
legislature intended that the term "physical injury" means a demonstrable injury to the child or a 
demonstrable adverse effect on the physical condition o/the child not a condition around the 
child which might potentially result in an injury. Therefore, it was not enough for the City to 
have proved Cannon caused a condition in which the child was potentially harmed. Rather, it was 
necessary for the City to have proved that Cannon caused an actual injury to the child or in some 
other manner affected condition of the child in a way that demonstrated an impairment of the 
physical condition of the child. This the City did not prove. 
Further, the term "any other condition which imperils the child's health or welfare" [§76-
5-109(l)(c)(iv)] must be interpreted in the context of subsection 76-5-109(3)(a)4 which sets forth 
the operative language criminalizing the act of one who "inflicts upon a child physical injury...." 
The Court of Appeals apparently ignored the meaning and intent of this section when interpreting 
the meaning and significance of subsection 76-5-109(l)(c)(iv). The American Heritage 
Dictionary defines "inflict" as: "1 . To deal or mete out (something punishing or burdensome); 
impose. 2. To afflict." Because rules of statutory interpretation mandate the assumption that "the 
Legislature used each term advisedly"5, the term "inflict" must be viewed as relevant to the 
overall scheme of the entire child abuse act. Consequently, the section under which Cannon was 
4See footnote 3. 
5Versluis v Guaranty National Cos.. 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah, 1992). 
5 
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< 
prosecuted proscribes one from "dealing or meting out" or "imposing" or "afflicting" upon a 
child an injury or condition which impairs the physical condition of the child. Certainly, the i 
legislature purposely used the word "inflict" to express its intent that the crime occurs when one 
actually causes an injury to or adversely affects the physical condition of a child, as opposed to 
i 
creating a condition where such an injury might be caused.6 
CONCLUSIONS 
When interpreted together, in light of the apparent overall scheme developed by the < 
legislature, subsections 76-5-109(1) and 76-5-109(3) clearly indicate the legislature's intent that 
the crime of child abuse in Utah occurs only when the actor's conduct results in a proven 
i 
physical injury to the child or a proven adverse effect to the physical condition of a child and not 
when the actor's conduct merely puts a child in harm's way. 
i 
i 
6In paragraph 11 of its Opinion, the Court of Appeals explains that under the scheme of 
the child abuse section "'physical injury' may include conditions that are not the result of 
physical impact." As examples, the Court notes that the section makes it a crime to cause 
emotional harm, developmental delay or retardation, starvation, failure to thrive, malnutrition, or 
impairment of the child's ability to function. Cannon does not disagree with this assessment nor 
does he dispute that had it been proved that he actually caused any of such conditions in the 
child, he would have been rightfully convicted. Cannon respectfully argues that the Court of 
Appeal's analysis fails because it does not recognize that the statute requires that one or more of 
such conditions must be proved to have resulted from his conduct in order to support his 
conviction. To be clear, the crux of Cannon's argument is that the statute requires proof of some 
resulting harm to the child, whether from physical impact or from a demonstrated adverse effect 
on the child's physical condition. Neither was proved in his case. 
6 
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PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Because the City of Provo failed to establish evidence that Cannon actually caused a 
physical injury to the child or actually caused an adverse effect to the physical condition of the 
child, his conviction should be reversed. 
Dated this 30th day of December, 1999. 
Thomas H. Means 
Attorney for David G. Cannon 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the o day of January, 2000,1 mailed two (2) true and correct 
copies of this PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to the following with all postage pre-
paid: 
Vernon F. (Rick) Romney 
Deputy Provo City Attorney 
P.O. Box 1849 
Provo, Utah, 84603 
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FILED 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. (IFf fl 9 1QQQ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
COURT OF APPEALS 00O00 
Provo City, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
David G. Cannon, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 981194-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 2 , 1999) 
; 1999 UT App 344 
Fourth District, Provo Department 
The Honorable Gary D. Stott 
Attorneys: Thomas H. Means, Provo, for Appellant 
Vernon F. Romney, Provo, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Orme. 
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge: 
1Jl Defendant David Cannon appeals his conviction for child 
abuse, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-109 (1999).l We conclude the trial court properly applied 
the statute and affirm his conviction. 
BACKGROUND 
%2 On March 13, 1996, defendant held the nine-month-old son of 
Christine Armstrong over the railing of defendant's Third-story 
apartment balcony. Several witnesses observed the incident, 
including defendant's wife, Cami, who told defendant to stop. 
Defendant then pulled the child back over the railing, and a 
neighbor took the baby from defendant. 
%3 Christine Armstrong, accompanied by two witnesses, went: to 
the Provo City Police Department on April 23, 1996, to report the 
incident. Sergeant Gary Hodgson met with the women and 
1. Section 76-5-109 was amended in 1997, 1998, and again in 
1999. No substantive changes were made in any of these 
amendments; we therefore cite to the most recent version of this 
statute, even though defendant was charged with the offense on 
January 7, 1997. ..- '^  Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
subsequently interviewed defendant concerning the allegations. 
On May 24, 1996, defendant voluntarily submitted to questioning 
and denied the allegations. 
H4 Based on the witnesses' statements made during Sergeant 
Hodgson's investigation, the county attorney filed child abuse 
charges against defendant under section 76-5-10 9 of the Utah 
Code.2 At trial, defendant moved to dismiss the charges after 
the State presented its case, arguing the State had offered no 
evidence of a physical injury as required by the- statute. The 
trial court denied the motion,3 and defendant rested without 
presenting a defense. The trial court then convicted defendant 
of one count of class A misdemeanor child abuse.4 Defendant 
2. Defendant was charged under subsection (3) of the child abuse 
statute, which states: 
Any person who inflicts upon a child physical 
injury or, having the*care, or custody of such 
child, causes or permits another to"inflict 
physical injury upon a child is guilty of an 
offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, 
the offense is a class A 
misdemeanor; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is 
a class B misdemeanor; or 
•(c) if done with criminal negligence, 
the offense is a class C 
misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(3) (1999). 
3. In denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the 
trial court stated: 
Well, as I read the statute, I find that 
physical injury as defined in subsection (4) 
of that paragraph, as [the Deputy County 
Attorney] has referred to it, as any other 
condition which imperils, and the other 
condition in this instance may well be the 
condition of placing the child over the 
railing, which would imperil the child's 
health or welfare. That is a factor of the 
physical injury as defined by the statute. 
4. Defendant urges us, alternatively, to conclude his conduct 
was either reckless or negligent.and reduce his conviction to a 
class B or C misdemeanor. His argument on this point, however, 
consisted of a one-sentence footnote at the end of his appellate 
brief. We therefore decline to address it. See Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). 
981194-CA 2 
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appeals, arguing the trial court erred by ruling his conduct fell 
within the purview of the child abuse statute. 
ANALYSIS 
H5 The precise issue before us is whether the trial court 
correctly determined that Utah's child abuse statute and its 
definition of "physical injury" can be applied to the facts of 
this case. Defendant contends the State presented no evidence 
establishing a physical injury or an impairment to the child's 
physical condition. Our analysis is thus limited to whether 
defendant "imperil[ed] the child's health or welfare" even though 
there was- no physical impact on the child. "The interpretation 
of a statute is a question of law, which we review for 
correctness." State v. Lowder. 889 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 1994) 
(citing State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993)). 
U6 When "construing a statute, our primary purpose '"is to give 
effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose 
the statute was meant to achieve."'" Wilson v. Valley Mental 
Health, 969 P.2d 416, 418 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). In 
doing so, we assume "the Legislature used each term advisedly, 
and we give effect to each term according to its ordinary and 
accepted meaning." Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'1 Cos., 842 P.2d 
865, 867 (Utah 1992). "[W]e look first to [the statute's] plain 
language as the best indicator of the legislature's intent and 
purpose in passing the statute. Only if that language is 
ambiguous do we turn to a consideration of legislative history 
and relevant policy considerations." Wilson, 969 P.2d at 418 
(citation omitted); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1999) 
("The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed shall 
not apply to this code . . . . All provisions of this code . . . 
shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms 
. . . . " ) ; In re K.T.S., 925 P.2d 603, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
That the parties disagree about the meaning of a statute does not 
necessarily make the statute ambiguous. See Derbidae v. Mutual 
Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). '"A 
statute is ambiguous [only] if it can be understood by reasonably 
well-informed persons to have different meanings.'" Id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 
P.2d 231, 233 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). 
1(7 The statute in question, section 76-5-109 of the Utah Code, 
prohibits the intentional, knowing, reckless, or criminally 
negligent infliction of a physical injury on a child. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-109(3). Subsection (1)(c) of that statute 
defines "physical injury" as:*-' 
an injury to or condition of a child which 
impairs the physical condition of the child, 
including: 
Qftl1Qd-TA * 3 
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(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin; 
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion; 
(iii)failure to thrive or malnutrition; or 
(iv) any other condition which imperils the 
child's health or welfare and which is 
not a serious physical injury as defined 
in subsection (1)(d). 
(Emphasis added.) 
%8 A separate provision of the statute defines "serious 
physical injury," in part, as: 
any physical injury or set of injuries which 
seriously impairs the child's health, or 
which involves physical torture or causes 
serious emotional harm to the child, or which 
involves a substantial risk of death to the 
child, including: 
(vii) any conduct toward a child which 
results in severe emotional harm, severe 
developmental delay or retardation, or severe 
impairment of "the child's ability to 
function; 
(x) .any conduct which results in starvation . _.. 
or failure to thrive or malnutrition that 
jeopardizes the child's life. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(1) (d) (1999) .5 
H 9 Defendant argues that, under the statute's scheme, the plain 
meaning of "physical injury" requires a physical impact on a 
child. Specifically, he points to the examples of physical 
injuries listed in subsections (1)(c)(i), (ii), and (iii)--each 
of which involves a physical impact--and argues that the meaning 
of "imperil" in subsection (1)(c)(iv), to be consistent with the 
other subsections, must require a physical impact. Because the 
5. The determination of whether a defendant inflicts "physical 
injury" or "serious physical injury" also determines the degree 
of offense. A defendant who inflicts serious physical injury can 
be charged with a greater degree of criminal liability, ranging 
from a class A misdemeanor for criminally negligent conduct* to a 
second degree felony for intentional or knowing conduct. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2) (1999). 
981194-CA 4 
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State presented no evidence that defendant's conduct had a 
physical impact on the child, defendant contends he did not 
imperil the child's health or welfare and thus his conviction 
cannot stand. 
UlO We first acknowledge that the Legislature has the power to 
define statutory terms as it wishes, and we are bound by those 
definitions. See 1A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory 
Construction § 20.08 (5th ed. 1993 & Supp. 1999) (citing 
McWhorter v. State Bd. of Registration for Prof'1 Enq'rs, 3 59 So. 
2d 769 (Ala. 1978)). Even if the chosen definition in this case 
"does not coincide with the ordinary meaning of the words," id., 
the definition is not "arbitrary, [does not] result in 
unreasonable classifications [and is not] uncertain." Id. 
(citations omitted). Furthermore, the definition is consistent 
with the rest of the statute as a whole and its general purpose, 
"which is to curb the increase in child abuse by imposing stiffer 
penalties on child abusers.1' State v. Jones', 735 P. 2d 399, 402 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted). The Legislature's 
chosen language defining "physical injury" therefore controls the 
meaning of "that term throughout the statute.6 See Sutherland . 
Stat. Constr. § 20.08.., at 90. 
flll We do not read the statutory definition as requiring some 
physical impact in order to imperil a child's health or welfare. 
Nowhere in the statute does the Legislature indicate physical 
injury is limited only to conditions resulting from a physical 
impact. In fact, the opposite is true. The statute's definition 
of "serious physical injury" includes injuries that can result 
from nonphysical abuse. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(1) (d) (vii) 
("any conduct toward a child which results in severe emotional 
harm, severe developmental delay or retardation, or severe 
impairment of the child's ability to function"); id. at § 76-5-
109(1) (d) (x) ("any conduct which results in starvation or failure 
to thrive or malnutrition that jeopardizes the child's life"). 
Likewise, under the Legislature's definitional rubric, "physical 
injury" may include conditions that are not the result of 
physical impact. 
i)l2 Our reading of subsection (1) (c) comports with our previous 
declaration about these definitions. In Jones, the defendant 
argued that "physical injury" and "serious physical injury,",as-
defined by the statute, were "two totally self-standing and 
independent concepts." 73 5 P.2d at 402 n.3. We rejected that 
notion, stating the definitions were part of "an integrated and 
carefully drawn statute," especially because "the text 
6. Because we conclude the statute's language is not ambiguous, 
we need not consider the Legislature's intent in passing section 
76-5-109. See Wilson, 969 P.2d at 418. 
r > m -i r\ A r^is. c; 
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introducing the definitions makes clear that the definitions are 
to be used throughout the entire statutory section." Id. 
<c-
Kl3 The statute, however, does not define "imperil"; we thus 
look to the term's ordinary and accepted meaning. See Versluis, 
842 P.2d at 867. Webster's defines "peril" as "exposure to the 
chance of injury," Webster's Dictionary 581 (New Rev. Updated Ed. 
1999), and "imperil" as to "endanger." Id. at 418.7 
Endangerment is precisely what the trial court found occurred in 
this case when"defendant, for some unfathomable reason, suspended 
an infant by his arms over a third-story balcony railing for 
several minutes. Defendant does not challenge the trial court's 
finding that this conduct imperiled the child, given the 
definition approved by this court and applied by the trial court. 
Hl4 Thus, under Utah's child abuse act, physical injury can 
include acts that imperil or threaten a child's health or welfare 
without an actual physical impact on the child. Consequently, we 
affirm defendant's conviction. 
«*£****<^ / ' QC^f,,^^ 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
\15 I CONCUR: 
Iforman H. Jactajfcfn, Judge 
H16 I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Gregory Ky/Orme, Judge 
7. We note that our reading of "endangerment" is in line with 
other jurisdictions' interpretations of statutes using the term. 
See, e.g.. State v. Deskins, 731 P.2d 104, 105-06 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1986); People v. Odom, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1028, 1032-33 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1991). 
981194-CA 6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Me* 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ' *' 
I hereby certify that on the 2nd day of December, 1999, a true 
and correct copy of the attached OPINION was deposited in the 
United States mail to: 
THOMAS H. MEANS 
ALDRICH NELSON WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
43 E 200 N 
PO BOX "L" 
PROVO UT 84603 - • 
VERNON F. ROMNEY 
PROVO CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
359 W CENTER. 
PO BOX 1849 
PROVO UT 84603 
and a true and correct copy of the attached OPINION was deposited 
in the United States mail to the judge listed below:' ' ' '' 
HONORABLE GARY D STOTT 
FOURTH DISTRICT, PROVO DEPT 
125 N 100 W 
PO BOX 1847 
PROVO UT 8 4 603 
/ / -
Judicial S e c r e t a r y ! / 
TRIAL COURT: FOURTH DISTRICT, PROVO DEPT, 971-24 0 
APPEALS CASE NO.: 981194-CA 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
